I also have an article on teaching philosophy in prisons, "Inequality in Education" in the first edition of Oberon, a periodical on art and academia.
Work in Progress
NB: all titles below have been changed from the submitted versions to ensure anonymity; and I am happy to make drafts available on request.
1. Merely Formal Normativity (under review)
Argues for a form of fictionalism about merely formal normativity (e.g., norms of etiquette, prescriptive grammar, honor codes, and so on), and explains how this helps defeat skepticism about normative authority.
2. Objectivism About Apparent Reasons (under review)
Argues that objectivist views about subjective reasons--from Mark Schroeder, Derek Parfit, Daniel Whiting, Kurt Sylvan, and others--face serious objections in cases involving probability and possibility.
3. The Semantics of Legal Normativity (under review)
Argues that normative terms in legal contexts (e.g., "obligation") have a generic meaning (a la Kratzer), rather than a moral meaning (a la Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro) or a distinct legal meaning (a la H.L.A. Hart).
4. Gender Pronouns (with Robin Dembroff) (under review)
Argues that we should use not use gender-specific pronouns ("he" and "she") (a) in relation to genderqueer individuals, and, more radically (b) in relation to anyone; we should use gender-neutral pronouns instead.
5. Wellbeing Measurement in Moral Philosophy (under review)
Argues that common appeals to psychological data about wellbeing to support ethical conclusions (in work by psychologists like Daniel Kahneman, and in thought experiments in normative ethics) are problematic because we do not know the intervals on the relevant scales.
6. The puzzle of normative testimony (under review)
Argues that normative testimony gives us reasons to believe, blame, admire, act, and so on; explains how this undermines common solutions to the puzzle of normative testimony, and suggests an alternative solution.
7. Resolving Judicial Dilemmas (with Alex Sarch) (under review)
Argues that judges should satisfice the moral and legal reasons that apply to them in contexts where there are conflicts between morality and law.
I am also currently working on a draft on a simple case against first-past-the-post electoral systems, a draft on moral perception and moral intuition, and a draft on the policy issues posed by mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. And I hope to soon turn to some far draftier drafts on a variety of other issues in metaethics, philosophy of law, philosophy of language, and social and political philosophy.