Research by area
Metaethics
My main interests in metaethics concern issues about realism, reasons, normative authority, and varieties of normativity. See:
- "Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?" (w/ B. Streumer), Analysis (forthcoming).
- “On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law" (w/ S. Chilovi), Philosophical Studies (2022).
- “Why formal objections to the error theory fail" (w/ B. Streumer), Analysis (2021).
- “Approving on the Basis of Normative Testimony", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16 (2021): 183-206. [Co-Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics 2019]
- “Who’s on First?", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15 (2020): 49-71.
- “Redundant Reasons", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(2) (2020): 266-278.
- “An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons”, Res Philosophica 96(2) (2019): 229-244.
- “Moral Perception, Inference, and Intuition”, Philosophical Studies 176(6) (2019): 1495-1512.
- “Mere Formalities: Normative Fictions and Normative Authority”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2019): 828-850.
- “Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12(3) (2017): pp. 259-279.
- “Why Realists Must Reject Normative Quietism”, Philosophical Studies 174(11) (2017): pp. 2795-2817.
- “Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 12 (R. Shafer-Landau, ed.) (2017): pp. 265-293.
Philosophy of Law
My main current interests in philosophy of law concern legal positivism, legal semantics, and legal normativity. See:
I've also worked on discrimination, and issues in judicial ethics in mass incarceration. See:
- "The Disunity of Legal Reality" (w/ D. Plunkett), Legal Theory (2022).
- "Legal Positivism and the Real Definition of Law" (w/ D. Plunkett), Jurisprudence (2022).
- “On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law" (w/ S. Chilovi), Philosophical Studies (2022).
- “What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(4) (2018): 790-816.
- “The Nature and Value of Vagueness in Law”, Ethics 131(4) (2021): 777-781.
I've also worked on discrimination, and issues in judicial ethics in mass incarceration. See:
- “Does Race Best Explain Racial Discrimination?" (w/ K. Singh), Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming).
- “Regulating Speech: Harm, Norms, and Discrimination", Inquiry (forthcoming).
- “Of Witches and White Folks", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022).
- “Resolving Judicial Dilemmas” (w/ A. Sarch), Virginia Journal of Criminal Law 6(1) 2018: 93-181.
- “Mandatory Minimums and the War on Drugs”, in D. Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy (2018): 51-62.
Philosophy of Race and Gender
My main current interests in this area concern racial justice (especially discrimination) and the ontology of race. See:
These also tie to broader interests in the ethics of communication about social groups, and previous work on gender pronouns and generics. See:
- “Does Race Best Explain Racial Discrimination?" (w/ K. Singh), Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming).
- “Regulating Speech: Harm, Norms, and Discrimination", Inquiry (forthcoming).
- “Of Witches and White Folks", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022).
These also tie to broader interests in the ethics of communication about social groups, and previous work on gender pronouns and generics. See:
- “He/She/They/Ze” (w/ R. Dembroff), Ergo 5(14) (2018): 371-406.
- “How Much Gender is Too Much Gender?” (w/ R. Dembroff), Routledge Handbook in Social and Political Philosophy of Language (J. Khoo and R. Sterken eds.) (2021): 362-377.
- “What a Loaded Generalization! Generics and social cognition” (w/ S.J. Leslie and M. Rhodes), Philosophy Compass 10(9) (2015): 625-635.
- “The Mark of the Plural: Generic Generalizations and Race” (w/ S.J. Leslie), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race (P.C. Taylor, L.M. Alcoff and L. Anderson Jr., eds.) (2017): pp. 277-289.
Social and Political Philosophy
My main current interests in political philosophy concern democracy and voting. See:
I've also worked on well-being measurement and egalitarianism, race and gender, and mass incarceration. See:
- "Which Majority Should Rule?", Philosophy & Public Affairs (forthcoming).
- "The Perversity of Weighted Voting", The Journal of Politics (forthcoming).
- "The Democratic Imperative to Make Margins Matter", Maryland Law Review (2023).
- “The Expressive Case Against Plurality Rule”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 27(3) (2019): 363-387.
I've also worked on well-being measurement and egalitarianism, race and gender, and mass incarceration. See:
- “What if Well-Being Measurements are Non-Linear?”, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(1) (2019): 29-45.
- “Does Race Best Explain Racial Discrimination?" (w/ K. Singh), Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming).
- “Regulating Speech: Harm, Norms, and Discrimination", Inquiry (forthcoming).
- “Of Witches and White Folks", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022).
- “He/She/They/Ze” (w/ R. Dembroff), Ergo 5(14) (2018): 371-406.
- “How Much Gender is Too Much Gender?” (w/ R. Dembroff), Routledge Handbook in Social and Political Philosophy of Language (J. Khoo and R. Sterken eds.) (2021): 362-377.
- “Mandatory Minimums and the War on Drugs”, in D. Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy (2018): 51-62.
Publications
Articles
- "One Person, One Vote", Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (forthcoming) [Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize for Political Philosophy 2023]
- “People’s Beliefs About Pronouns Reflect Both the Language They Speak and Their Ideologies" (w/ A. Bailey, R. Dembroff, E. Ikizer, & A. Cimpian), Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (forthcoming).
- "Which Majority Should Rule?", Philosophy & Public Affairs (forthcoming).
- "The Perversity of Weighted Voting", The Journal of Politics (forthcoming): https://doi.org/10.1086/727599
- "Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?" (w/ B. Streumer), Analysis 83(4) (2023): 732–741.
- “Does Race Best Explain Racial Discrimination?" (w/ K. Singh), Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming): https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2463
- “Regulating Speech: Harm, Norms, and Discrimination", Inquiry (forthcoming): https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2313715
- "The Democratic Imperative to Make Margins Matter", Maryland Law Review 82(2) (2023): 365-442.
- "The Disunity of Legal Reality" (w/ D. Plunkett), Legal Theory (2022).
- "Legal Positivism and the Real Definition of Law" (w/ D. Plunkett), Jurisprudence (2022).
- “On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law" (w/ S. Chilovi), Philosophical Studies (2022).
- “Of Witches and White Folks", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022).
- “Why formal objections to the error theory fail" (w/ B. Streumer), Analysis (2021).
- See also this response: C. Tiefensee and G. Wheeler, "Why formal objections to the error theory are sound", Analysis 82(4) 2022: 608–616
- “Approving on the Basis of Normative Testimony", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16 (2021): 183-206. [Co-Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics 2019]
- “Who’s on First?", Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15 (2020): 49-71.
- “Redundant Reasons", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(2) (2020): 266-278.
- “The Expressive Case Against Plurality Rule”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 27(3) (2019): 363-387.
- “An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons”, Res Philosophica 96(2) (2019): 229-244.
- “Moral Perception, Inference, and Intuition”, Philosophical Studies 176(6) (2019): 1495-1512.
- “What if Well-Being Measurements are Non-Linear?”, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(1) (2019): 29-45.
- See also this response: C.L. Philippi, "Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption: A Response to Wodak", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2023).
- “Mere Formalities: Normative Fictions and Normative Authority”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2019): 828-850.
- “He/She/They/Ze” (w/ R. Dembroff), Ergo 5(14) (2018): 371-406.
- “What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(4) (2018): 790-816.
- “Resolving Judicial Dilemmas” (w/ A. Sarch), Virginia Journal of Criminal Law 6(1) 2018: 93-181.
- “Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12(3) (2017): pp. 259-279.
- “Why Realists Must Reject Normative Quietism”, Philosophical Studies 174(11) (2017): pp. 2795-2817.
- “Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 12 (R. Shafer-Landau, ed.) (2017): pp. 265-293.
- “What a Loaded Generalization! Generics and social cognition” (w/ S.J. Leslie and M. Rhodes), Philosophy Compass 10(9) (2015): 625-635.
- “How Much Gender is Too Much Gender?” (w/ R. Dembroff), Routledge Handbook in Social and Political Philosophy of Language (J. Khoo and R. Sterken eds.) (2021): 362-377.
- “Mandatory Minimums and the War on Drugs”, in D. Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy (2018): 51-62.
- “The Mark of the Plural: Generic Generalizations and Race” (w/ S.J. Leslie), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race (P.C. Taylor, L.M. Alcoff and L. Anderson Jr., eds.) (2017): pp. 277-289.
- "Quietism", in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, D. Copp and C. Rosati (eds.), Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
- “The Nature and Value of Vagueness in Law”, Ethics 131(4) (2021): 777-781.