Publications

1. "What a Loaded Generalization! Generics and social cognition'' (w/ S.J. Leslie and M. Rhodes), Philosophy Compass 10(9) 2015: 625-635. 
2. "The Mark of the Plural: Generic Generalizations and Race'' (w/ S.J. Leslie), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race (P.C. Taylor, L.M. Alcoff and L. Anderson, eds.) 2017: 277-289.
3. "Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity'', Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 12 (R. Shafer-Landau, ed.) (2017), pp. 265-293. 
4. "Why realists must reject normative quietism", Philosophical Studies (2017) 174 (11): pp. 2795-2817
5. “Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?”, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (forthcoming) 
6. "Resolving Judicial Dilemmas" (w/ A. Sarch), Virginia Journal of Criminal Law (forthcoming)
7. “What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). 

I also have an article on teaching philosophy in prisons, "Inequality in Education" in the first edition of Oberon, a periodical on art and academia. 

Work in Progress

NB: all titles below have been changed from the submitted versions to ensure anonymity; and I am happy to make drafts available on request. 

​1. Merely Formal Normativity (under review)
Argues for a form of fictionalism about merely formal normativity (e.g., norms of etiquette, prescriptive grammar, honor codes, and so on), and explains how this helps defeat skepticism about normative authority. 

2. Gender Pronouns (with Robin Dembroff) (under review)
Argues that we should use not use gender-specific pronouns ("he" and "she") (a) in relation to genderqueer individuals, and, more radically (b) in relation to anyone; we should use gender-neutral pronouns instead. 

3. Wellbeing Measurement in Moral Philosophy (under review) 
Argues that common appeals to psychological data about wellbeing to support ethical conclusions (in work by psychologists like Daniel Kahneman, and in thought experiments in normative ethics) are problematic because we do not know the intervals on the relevant scales.  

4. The puzzle of normative testimony (under review)
Argues that normative testimony gives us reasons to believe, blame, admire, act, and so on; explains how this undermines common solutions to the puzzle of normative testimony, and suggests an alternative solution. 

5. Against First-Past-the-Post (under review)
Argues against first-past-the-post electoral systems (such as those used in national elections in the U.K. and U.S.) and for alternatives like preferential voting (such as instant runoff voting, which is used in Australia).

I am also currently working on papers on moral perception and moral intuition and on policy issues posed by mandatory minimum sentencing provisions (which are promised to different venues by December), and a paper on echo chambers. And I hope to soon turn to some far draftier drafts on a variety of other issues in metaethics, philosophy of law, philosophy of language, and social and political philosophy.